The Cross-National Determinants of Legislative Party Switching by Knott, Cassie Millet
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2017
The Cross-National Determinants of Legislative
Party Switching
Cassie Millet Knott
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, cassiemknott@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Knott, Cassie Millet, "The Cross-National Determinants of Legislative Party Switching" (2017). LSU Master's Theses. 4501.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4501
THE CROSS-NATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE PARTY SWITCHING
A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of Political Science
by
Cassie Millet Knott




1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
2 Cross-National Analysis of Party Switching................................................................ 3
3 Party Switching: Motivations and Institutions ........................................................... 6
3.1 Party Switching and Legislator Motivations ....................................................... 8
3.2 Party Switching and Institutions ........................................................................ 12
4 Cross-National Data and Measurement....................................................................... 15
4.1 Party Switching................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Explanatory Variables......................................................................................... 17
5 Cross-National Analysis .............................................................................................. 20
6 Discussion.................................................................................................................... 26
7 New Zealand Case Study ............................................................................................ 28
8 Party Switching and Electoral Rules........................................................................... 31
8.1 Why New Zealand? ............................................................................................. 31
8.2 Legislative Party Switching in New Zealand....................................................... 33
9 New Zealand Data and Measurement ......................................................................... 40
9.1 Dependent Variable: Party Switching................................................................. 40
9.2 Explanatory Variable: Vote-Seeking ................................................................... 40
9.3 Control Variables ................................................................................................ 41
10 New Zealand Analysis ................................................................................................. 43
11 Conclusion................................................................................................................... 49
References ......................................................................................................................... 51
Appendix 1: Cross-National Analysis Data...................................................................... 57




Why do legislators switch parties? What accounts for variation in party switching across
different countries? How do electoral rules impact legislative party switching behavior and
how is this behavior impacted by changes to these rules? The first chapter of this study
builds on the existing body of research on the determinants of legislative party switching.
More specifically, I build on the extant theories which have identified vote-, office-, and
policy-seeking as motivations of legislator behavior. I examine the strategic decision making
of legislators in various institutional contexts and argue that such contexts create or modify
incentives and constraints that condition the decision to switch parties. Moving beyond the
single country and cross-national party level analyses prevalent in the literature, this study
attempts to approach party switching with a cross-national battery of variables from an orig-
inal individual-level dataset. This dataset includes observations from Canada, Italy, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom from 1990-2001. I find support for vote- and policy-seeking
hypotheses as well as district and system level institutional variables. In order to investigate
how electoral rules impact party switching behavior, the second section of this study focuses
on New Zealand and the evolution of its electoral system. These changes include a transition
from a pure single-member district (SMD) electoral system to a mixed-member (MM), com-
pensatory proportional representation system in 1996. Preliminary evidence suggests that
the change to a MM electoral system is associated with a rise in the frequency of legislative
party switching in New Zealand’s House of Representatives. Additionally, there is evidence
that party switching legislators are motivated by vote-seeking concerns over reelection.
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1 Introduction
Why do legislators switch parties? What accounts for variation in party switching across
different countries? This study builds on the existing body of research on the determinants
of legislative party switching. More specifically, I build on the extant theories which have
identified vote-, office-, and policy-seeking as motivations of legislator behavior. I examine
the strategic decision making of legislators in various institutional contexts and argue that
such contexts create or modify incentives and constraints that condition the decision to
switch parties.
Party switching is normatively problematic for a number of reasons related to democratic
representation, regime legitimacy, and political corruption. Numerous scholars have analyzed
party systems and have revealed the harms of unstable party systems for they can decrease
the stability and sustainability of democracy (Ames, 2001; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999;
Carey and Shugart, 1995). The growing body of research on party switching is also clear on
the detrimental effect party switching can have on party systems. Desposato (2006) argues
party switching violates one of the core pacts of democracy in that it makes it increasingly
difficult for voters to identify the optimal candidate that corresponds with their preferences.
Over time, this can decrease party legitimacy and transform party labels into meaningless
initials (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Tavits, 2009). Fluid party systems have been linked
to an increase in party switching as a method used by legislators to escape accountability
(Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad, 2005).
I utilize both a cross-national approach and a case study of New Zealand to investigate
the factors that increase party switching. This dataset includes observations from Canada,
Italy, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom from 1990-2008. I find support for vote- and
policy-seeking hypotheses as well as district and system level institutional variables such as
seat and ballot type as well as the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP).
How do electoral rules impact legislative party switching behavior and how is this be-
havior impacted by changes to these rules? Changes in a country’s electoral system are
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rare occurrences. I attempt to determine how electoral rules influence a legislator’s deci-
sion to switch parties through the evolution of New Zealand’s electoral system during the
1990s and beyond. The country’s changes include a transition from a pure single-member
district (SMD) electoral system to a mixed-member (MM), compensatory proportional rep-
resentation system in 1996. Evidence suggests that the change to a MM electoral system
is associated with a rise in the frequency of legislative party switching in New Zealand’s
House of Representatives. Additionally, there is evidence that party switching legislators are
motivated by vote-seeking concerns over reelection and there are distinguishable differences
between MPs of different electorates — or seat type— as well as on what ballots an MP
appeared.
This study is divided into two components; the first, which begins in the following section,
is the cross-national analysis and the second is a case study of New Zealand and appears
after the conclusion of the first.
2
2 Cross-National Analysis of Party Switching
Why do legislators switch parties? What accounts for variation in party switching across
different countries? In a fifty year span, from 1947 to 1997, only 20 members of the U.S.
Congress, from either chamber, switched political parties (Nokken, 2000). Yet, in the five
years of Italy’s thirteenth parliament (1996-2001), nearly 25% of the 630 member Chamber of
Deputies changed party affiliation. Party switching is a relatively understudied phenomenon
(O’Brien and Shomer, 2013). As a result, scholars of legislatures and political parties do not
have a firm grasp of its prevalence. Information accumulated through the execution of dozens
of single-country case studies serves as the bedrock of this body of literature.1 Outside these
case studies of countries with high occurrences of party switching, it is believed that party
switching is a rarity (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2008). However, a recent study
shows that party switching occurs more frequently and more broadly than the literature
suggests. O’Brien and Shomer (2013) have found that among 239 political parties, nearly
one-third have experienced party switching behavior and fourteen of the twenty countries
analyzed witnessed some degree of switching.
One thing that scholars of legislatures have agreed upon is that party switching is nor-
matively problematic for a number of reasons related to democratic representation, regime
legitimacy, and political corruption. The literature has come to a consensus that unstable
party systems decrease the stability and sustainability of democracy (Ames, 2001; Bowler,
Farrell and Katz, 1999; Carey and Shugart, 1995). The growing body of research on party
switching is also clear on the detrimental effect party switching can have on party systems.
Desposato (2006) argues party switching violates one of the core pacts of democracy in that
it makes it increasingly difficult for voters to identify the optimal candidate that corresponds
1Some of the more notable case studies conducted include those on the countries of Brazil (Mainwaring
and Perez-Linan, 1997; Desposato, 2006, 2009), Taiwan (Fell, 2014), Mexico (Barrow, 2007; Kerevel, 2014),
Italy (Heller and Mershon, 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008; Virgilio, Giannetti and Pinto, 2012), Russia
(Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008), Poland (McMenamin and Gwiazda, 2011; Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad,
2005), Japan (Desposato and Scheiner, 2008), South Africa (McLaughlin, 2011), and Ecuador (Mejia-Acosta,
2004), to name a few.
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with their preferences. Over time, this can decrease party legitimacy and transform party
labels into meaningless initials (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Tavits, 2009). Fluid party sys-
tems have been linked to an increase in party switching as a method used by legislators to
escape accountability (Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad, 2005). Heller and Mershon (2008)
observe that countries whose parties are known for high levels of cohesion, such as Italy, also
suffer from extreme levels of party switching within their legislative bodies. This is juxta-
posed with legislative systems with low party cohesion and exceptionally rare occurrences of
party switching as in the United States.
Yet, legislative scholars interested in party unity typically ignore party switching behavior
in their research. It is often dismissed as simply an indicator of weak party discipline or
weakly institutionalized parties. However, there is a lack of consensus among empirical
studies that this is the case. Party switching is a risky endeavor from the perspective of
legislators and their decision to do so can provide profitable insight into the preferences
of politicians. In this paper, I build upon the extant theories which have identified vote-,
office-, and policy-seeking as motivations of legislator behavior (Fenno, 1973). I examine the
strategic decision making of legislators in various institutional contexts and argue that such
contexts create or modify incentives and constraints that condition the decision to switch
parties. This paper seeks to address how institutional differences can lead to divergent
outcomes cross-nationally in levels of party switching as well as to determine the motivations
behind a legislator’s decision to change party affiliation. Additionally, I attempt to discern
the distinct effects of district and national level measures as well as how they interact in
predicting the probability of a legislator switching parties.
Case studies have left us without the empirical leverage to investigate the role of various
institutions given that they cannot be adequately studied without cross-national analysis.
It is here I attempt to situate my contribution.2 Given the integral role of institutions
2Thus far, only one study has been conducted on the cross-national determinants of party switching.
O’Brien and Shomer (2013) attempt to determine the impact of the behavioral trichotomy of vote-, office-,
and policy-seeking motivations as well as the impact of several institutional variables on the occurrence of
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in shaping behavior, it is vital they are included in any analysis that seeks to determine
why legislators switch parties and why this behavior is more frequent in some countries
but not others. By conducting a cross-national analysis on individual level data, I am in a
unique position to include both district level and national level variables that may explain
the occurrence of party switching. Furthermore, my analysis will enable the strength of the
institutional indicators to be evaluated alongside legislative motivations.
Through the use of an original data set, I demonstrate support for the motivational hy-
potheses of legislative party switching and for institutional explanations for its occurrence.
Specifically, I find that both an MP’s district vote share and her party’s national vote share
are negatively associated with party switching which substantiates the notion that legisla-
tors use party switching as a strategy to improve electoral support. In support of theories
that suggest policy-seeking motivations for party switching, I find ideological extremity is
positively related with the probability that a legislator switches party. Additionally, small
district magnitudes and a high number of political parties are substantial predictors of party
switching. The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of what is known about
party switching as well as my theoretical expectations regarding legislative motivations, in-
stitutions, and party switching. The third section identifies my data and measurement of
the variables included in my statistical analysis. In the fourth section, I discuss the results
followed by a concluding section which includes a summary of findings and avenues for future
research.
party switching. While this study has done much to advance the research agenda, it is limited in that the
analysis was conducted at the party level.
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3 Party Switching: Motivations and Institutions
Like much of the extant literature, I begin with the assumption that legislators are rational,
utility-maximizing individuals with preferences (Laver and Benoit, 2003). Their decisions,
including whether to remain in their party or cross the floor, are based on cost-benefit
analyses. As research has shown, legislative party membership is associated with both costs
and payoffs that are taken into account while a legislator continuously reviews the decision
to switch parties during a legislative term (Cox, 1987).
Most scholarship on legislative decision-making focuses on the motivations that influence
politicians. Drawing from the literature on American legislative politics, one can assume
legislators desire a number of things. Most of this literature is built on the scholarly work of
Mayhew (1974) in his seminal study of the electoral connection which conceives of legislators
in the U.S. House as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” However, studies of the electoral
connection beyond the context of the United States has determined that not all legislators
are single-minded seekers of reelection. For instance, David Samuels (2003) demonstrates
that federalism in Brazil discourages members of the Chamber of Deputies from seeking
reelection and incentivizes them to seek subnational offices. Jones and colleagues (2002)
find a similar relationship in Argentina. Richard Fenno (1973) characterizes legislators as
individuals that seek to maximize their electoral support, increase prestige and power within
the legislature or advance to a higher office, and affect public policy. These vote-, office-, and
policy-seeking goals, respectively, factor into the calculus of legislators’ decision-making and
have been utilized to explain legislative behavior around the world (Giannetti and Laver,
2001; Heller and Mershon, 2005, 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008; Shomer, 2009).
In subsequent research, scholars have demonstrated how the political party is a vehicle
for legislators to achieve these goals (Aldrich, 2011; Aldrich and Bianco, 1992; Mu¨ller and
Strom, 1999; Nokken, 2000; Thames, 2007). Some of the benefits of party membership
include financial and human resources during a campaign, access to government funds and
power over its distribution, and the ability to engage in the policy-making process. One can
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assume that if legislators utilize parties to obtain their self-interested goals, they can also use
party switching behavior as a strategy to the same end. A burgeoning body of work within
legislative studies relaxes the assumption that parties are unitary actors whose legislative
membership bases are permanent from election to election. Recent scholarship emphasizes
the role of legislators within political parties as individuals who engage in strategic interaction
to achieve their own ambitions and preferences (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2008).
Indeed, Heller and Mershon argue party switching is a “natural consequence of political
ambition” and a reaction to party discipline (2008, p. 910). If party discipline is an obstacle
to a politician’s preferred outcome, whether it be pursuing a certain policy or vote maxi-
mization to increase chances of reelection, the politician has an incentive to switch parties.
Numerous case studies find support for these expectations.3 Furthermore, recent scholar-
ship has shown a relationship between the type of behavior that is exhibited by a legislator
and the temporal placement within a legislative cycle. Mershon and Shvetsova (2013) have
demonstrated that as elections draw nearer, legislators are deterred from party switching,
especially in candidate-centered electoral systems. Another study shows subnational elec-
tions serve as signals of a party’s electoral strength during a legislative term and temporally
coincides with party switching activity (Heller and Mershon, 2005). All of these studies indi-
cate legislators often engage in strategic behavior with political parties in order to maximize
their chances of obtaining their goals.
Much of what is known about party switching has reinforced the idea that parties exert
vast amounts of influence over the future career of a member legislator (Cain, Ferejohn and
Fiorina, 1984; Gaines and Garrett, 1993; Taylor, 1992). The extant literature centers around
the motives behind an MP’s decision to switch parties or not.
3See Desposato (2006); Mershon and Shvetsova (2008); Reed and Scheiner (2003).
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3.1 Party Switching and Legislator Motivations
If politicians utilize parties in order to achieve a preferred outcome, it follows that party
switching is a strategy they can use to pursue their goals.4 Operating under the assumption
that legislative party switching is legal within a country, the literature presents three plausible
explanations for why a legislator might change party affiliations: to maximize votes (vote-
seeking), obtain political advancement or power (office-seeking), or to affect policy change
(policy-seeking).5 Political parties may prioritize and weigh these goals differently and the
range of these differences increases when examining individual candidates’ preferences (Lott,
1987). It should be noted these motivations are not easily distinguishable from one another.
Office- and policy-seeking legislators must also maintain their seats and must engage in vote-
seeking behaviors in order to obtain their primary goals. In similar fashion, policy-oriented
MPs must typically be a member of a party in the government in order to pursue their policy
goals. While the separation of these behaviors simplifies matters for observational research,
they are not as straightforward in reality.
A number of studies support the notion that legislators are vote-seekers that are chiefly
concerned with shoring up enough electoral support to guarantee reelection (Aldrich and
Bianco, 1992; Herron, 2002). Several countries have laws that do not allow legislators to
be reelected to consecutive terms such as Costa Rica and Mexico. However, legislators in
these countries often times seek election in a different legislative chamber or a subnational
office where party affiliation, and party leaders themselves, can impact the outcome (Kerevel,
2014; Taylor, 1992). In these situations, there is still an incentive for legislators to engage
in vote-seeking behavior to improve the strength of the party label (Pekkanen, Nyblade and
Krauss, 2006). Therefore, a politician that is primarily concerned with winning an election
4The caveat here is that there cannot be any institutional restrictions against party switching during a
legislative term, such as laws that have been on the books in countries such as Belize, South Africa, and
New Zealand (during the early 2000s). See Janda (2009).
5See Aldrich (2011); Desposato (2006); Fenno (1973); Mu¨ller and Strom (1999); Nokken (2000); Reed
and Scheiner (2003).
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may switch parties if she perceives her chances of being elected with her current party
affiliation as unlikely. With few exceptions, legislators are elected by voters in electoral
districts. Depending on the particular arrangement of a country’s electoral rules, legislators
depend on subsequent votes from this district to retain their seats during a future legislative
term. If reelection is a primary concern of legislators, one would expect them to engage in
vote-seeking behavior. For some legislators, this entails remaining in their current party and
switching is preferable only to those legislators whose party fails to sufficiently increase the
legislator’s chances of winning reelection from her perspective.
In addition to district electoral performance, legislators are interested in maintaining a
strong party label for reelection purposes (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Pekkanen, Nyblade
and Krauss, 2006). Conversely, legislators in nationally popular parties that perform poorly
regarding district votes face incentives to switch to a party that can better guarantee them
the district votes that will send them back to parliament. While the overall impact of a
party’s national electoral performance is expected to be negatively associated with party
switching, the precise effect is believed to be conditional on district electoral performance.
Not all legislators in nationally less popular parties switch parties. For example, politicians
with high district support who are members of parties that fail to achieve a satisfactory
portion of the overall votes cast in a country may not feel the need to engage in vote-
seeking behavior since they are in a safe district. Some studies have shown that a portion
of a party’s legislators devote their time and resources to legislative matters that are more
salient to party constituencies that are not geographically bounded (Blais and Massicotte,
1996; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss, 2006; Stratmann and Baur, 2002). Parties delegate
these responsibilities to ensure the maintenance of the party’s national appeal and reputation
for its provision is a collective good for all party members. The party’s reputation forces
legislators to consider the national performance of their party in tandem with their district
performance. This leads to the formation of the first hypothesis:
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H1: Legislators who perform poorly in their district or are members of a party
who performed poorly nationally are more likely to change parties than legisla-
tors (or legislators in a party) who perform well electorally in their district (or
nationally).
The effect of party performance on party switching may be contingent upon the amount of
electoral support an MP receives within her district. For example, an MP in a safe district
may discount her party’s national performance to a greater degree than an MP in a more
competitive district.
While maintaining office is a vital concern to a majority of legislators, vote maximiza-
tion is the precursor to other legislative goals that politicians pursue. A legislator has no
hope of acquiring a more powerful position in the legislature or shape policies if she can-
not win reelection. Legislators’ office-seeking objectives are fueled by progressive ambition
(Aldrich and Bianco, 1992; Black, 1972; Riker, 1962; Rohde, 1979; Schlesinger, 1966). In a
study of party switching in Mexico, Kerevel (2014) finds that most of the country’s party
switching activity can be explained by the office-seeking motives of ambitious politicians. In
such cases, legislators may change party affiliations when their current party cannot provide
them with an attractive legislative post, such as a leadership position or membership on a
certain influential committee. Additionally, legislators may abandon their party if there are
a lack of advancement opportunities and instead switch to a party where their membership
is of more consequence or prestige (Kam, 2009). Parties that form the government usually
have more resources available to its members and also have control over more leadership
and committee positions to distribute to satisfy its members’ progressive ambition (Taylor,
1992). Conversely, parties of the opposition lack these advantages. More broadly, parties in
government possess desirable agenda-setting power (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). One would
expect a legislator exhibiting office-seeking behavior to switch parties from an opposition
party to a party that forms the government. This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H2: Legislators of governing parties are less likely to switch than members of
opposition parties.
In addition to electoral support and prestigious positions, legislators depend on political
parties for the enactment of policies they or their constituents support. Scholars have shown
that when legislators of the same party share ideological goals there are fewer occurrences of
defection (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2009). The more ideologically divergent a
legislator is from her party, the more frequently she will have to vote against her preferences in
order to walk the party line. Studies have demonstrated that in instances where a legislator’s
ideal point is further from her party’s policy preferences, the more likely the legislator will
be to defect from the party through the casting of a conflicting vote or changing of party
affiliation (Herron, 2002; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 1997; Reed and Scheiner, 2003).
Additionally, party unity is linked to a party’s ability to affect policy outcomes (Bowler,
Farrell and Katz, 1999; Carey, 2007). Therefore, a legislator whose party is ideologically
divergent or too different from herself may motivate the legislator to change parties in order
to increase her capability of affecting her preferred policy goals. Extreme parties may not
provide ample opportunity for policy-seeking legislators because of the dearth of ideologically
proximate actors in the legislature to assist in pursuing policy goals. This leads to the
formation of a third hypothesis which is presented below:
H3: Legislators who are members of more ideologically extreme parties are more
likely to switch parties than legislators who are members of less ideologically ex-
treme parties.
This expectation rests on a specific conceptualization of policy-seeking. Here, this term is
used to indicate that a legislator with a policy preference acts on behalf of a second preference
to shape policy rather than the notion that the legislator simply has policy preferences (Heller
and Mershon, 2008). I am not arguing that extreme parties are not policy-oriented for this
clearly is not the case. MPs of these parties can advocate policies but are not considered
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policy-seekers unless they engage in activity to influence policy. The distinction here is that
legislators in extreme parties that aim to affect policy must caucus with enough colleagues to
constitute a majority; MPs from ideologically extreme parties have fewer potential partners
due to the lack of ideologically proximate MPs. This may increase the likelihood that
legislators from extreme parties will switch parties in an attempt to be more successful in
their policy-seeking endeavors.
3.2 Party Switching and Institutions
There is a large and growing body of research that contends that institutional arrange-
ments impact legislative decision-making (Ames, 1995; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984;
Heitshusen, Young and Wood, 2005; Micozzi, 2012). Much of this literature shows that in-
stitutions affect legislative behavior by influencing incentives and constraining actions. As
with vote-seeking, both district and national level institutional features may prove to be
useful indicators for explaining the occurrence of party switching.
Because the success of a legislator achieving her vote-, office-, and policy-seeking goals
depends on her seat retention, the probability of being awarded a seat in parliament factors
heavily into a legislator’s decision-making calculus. Election to the legislature depends on
the number of access points, or number of seats, available to candidates. The number of seats
available in each electoral district in PR and mixed-member systems varies from district to
district. In multi-member districts, politicians/parties can typically win seats with smaller
vote shares than in SMDs. A greater number of seats increases the chances of a legislator
winning a seat and has been shown to increase party loyalty (Hix, 2004). This combination
of increased party loyalty and greater chances of winning a seat should reduce the occurrence
of party switching in districts with greater magnitudes.
An additional reason why legislators from districts with greater magnitudes should be less
likely to switch parties than their low district magnitude counterparts stems from the degree
to which candidate-centered, SMD (and open-list PR) systems encourage the cultivation
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of the personal vote compared to party-centered, PR systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995;
Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984; Crisp, 2007; Crisp, Jensen and Shomer, 2007). This
emphasis on personal reputation comes at the cost of the importance of the party label
which would allow legislators leeway to switch parties. Thames and Castelberg (2006) show
that in mixed-member systems, legislators elected through SMD rules were more likely to
switch than those elected via party list PR. Furthermore, one may expect legislators in
multimember districts to engage in less personal vote cultivation activity than their single
member district counterparts because credit claiming is more difficult when responsibilities
are shared with other legislators in a district. The possibility of sharing credit with other
legislators who may or may not have contributed the cause, and quite possibly with legislators
of an opposing party, reduces the incentives for MPs in multimember districts to engage
in personal vote cultivation (Heitshusen, Young and Wood, 2005; Klein, 2016). If this is
the case, lower district magnitudes should reinforce personal vote cultivation while greater
district magnitudes should undermine it which leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: Legislators elected in districts with fewer seats are more likely to switch
parties than legislators elected in districts with more seats.
In their analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Heller and Mershon (2005) suggest
an opposing argument. They posit PR legislators are more likely to switch than their SMD
counterparts contingent upon the clear party labels. However, several studies have not
encountered this finding (Kerevel, 2014; O’Brien and Shomer, 2013). I contend MPs from
districts with fewer seats, particularly SMDs, should be associated with more switching than
PR legislators. Candidate selection methods in SMDs and MMDs (multimember districts)
are oftentimes quite different. MMDs typically have a more centralized candidate selection
process with greater party control that includes party lists where seniority and loyalty are
rewarded with better list positions. In this environment, party leaders may be reluctant to
take a risk on a disloyal or seemingly fickle politician. On the other hand, SMDs usually have
a decentralized candidate selection process which reinforces personal vote cultivation and
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undermines party service and loyalty. Legislators in these districts can avoid the influence
and power held by party leaders in MMDs and win their reelection through other means
than party approval.
Turning to the national level, having more parties provides more alternatives to politicians
in pursuit of preferential outcomes (Mershon and Shvetsova, 2013). Many studies have
demonstrated that party competition dynamics fluctuate over time according to the number
of parties within a system (Powell, 2000; Schofield and Sened, 2006). More alternatives
improves the chances that something besides the status quo is optimal which could make a
politician more likely to switch parties as the number of alternatives increases. Mershon and
Shvetsova (2013) provide evidence that the effective number of parliamentary parties at the
beginning of a legislative term increases the amount of party switching. One would expect
legislators in party systems with a greater number of parties to be more likely to change
affiliations than legislators in party systems with fewer parties.
H5: Legislators in systems with more political parties are more likely to switch
than legislators in systems with fewer political parties.
The previous two hypotheses may seem to be at odds with Duverger’s Law and its
proponents (Duverger, 1954). However, as Cox (1997) notes, Duverger developed his theory
at the district level whereas I am concerned with the number of parties at the national
level. Cox argues Duverger’s Law may hold across all SMDs within a country yet produce a
multiparty system at the national level because some political parties are only competitive
in certain regions. Therefore, district magnitude does not always correlate with ENPP and
the two electoral features can exert different influences on legislative behavior.
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4 Cross-National Data and Measurement
In order to test the above stated hypotheses, I use an original dataset of 2,062 individual-
level observations of legislators in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature.6
These data were gathered from government archival websites from four countries across seven
legislative terms.7 The countries included in this analysis are Canada, Italy, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom between the years 1990-2008.8 These four countries and this time
period were chosen for three reasons. First, each of these countries has experience with
democracy that dates back numerous decades. Second, there is some degree of institutional
variety and occurrence of party switching among them which the selection of legislative terms
maximizes. Lastly, while the UK and Canada’s institutional arrangements have remained
fairly consistent over time, both New Zealand and Italy experienced changes to their electoral
systems during the 1990s. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in the appendix.
4.1 Party Switching
Heller and Mershon (2009) have developed a typology for the classification of different types
of party switching that captures the consolidation and stabilization of a party system as well
as the fragmentation and weakening of it. Party switches are first categorized as either an
inswitch, where a legislator changes from one party affiliation to another, or an outswitch
which occurs when a legislator abandons a party label without selecting a replacement af-
filiation. Furthermore, these scholars classify a party switch as switching across already
existing parties, a fusion where two or more parties merge to formulate a new party, a fission
where one party is split into two or more smaller parties, or a start-up if the receiving party
6The number of observations that appear in the empirical analysis decreases to 1,991 because I exclude
legislators that were elected to parliament in a by-election. Additionally, the Comparative Manifesto Project
does not have left-right ideological placement measures for all parties in the dataset. A few legislators from
minor parties who were non-party switchers are excluded for this reason.
7Data for New Zealand was supplemented by John M. Carey’s Legislative Voting Project (Carey, 2016).
8The legislative terms included in the dataset are Canada (1997-2000) Italy (1996-2001), New Zealand
(1990-1993, 1993-1996, 1996-1999, and 2005-2008), and the United Kingdom (1997-2001).
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is a new party. All of these scenarios are empirically observable across the population of
party systems with start-ups being the most prevalent in post-communist Europe and re-
democratized Latin America (Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad, 2005). The dataset used
in this paper includes inswitches, outswitches, fusions, fissions, and start-ups.
A party switch is defined as “any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a
politician holding or competing for elective office” (Heller and Mershon, 2009, p. 8). For the
purposes of this study, there are a couple of clarifications to be made. First, only legislators
who switch parties during the legislative term are considered. Laver and Benoit (2003)
explore the evolution of party systems between elections and illuminate potential causal
mechanisms that differ between those expected to operate behind inter-party movement
during a legislative term.9 Second, legislators who were members of a party that was dissolved
and whose member base was absorbed by another party are not considered party switchers
by default. If a party merged with another, only legislators that did not follow the party into
the merge are coded as switchers. This means that if a legislator was in party A which was
merged into party B, the legislator is not coded as a party switcher if her affiliation changed
to party B. However, if she switched to party C, she is coded as a party switcher. Because
this paper partly seeks to parse out which motivational factors are most influential on the
decision to party switch (and thereby attempting to answer the question of why a legislator
changed parties), party dissolution is a known, identifiable reason and is not considered a
puzzle. Likewise, members who are expelled from their parties for scandal-related reasons
are also not considered party switchers in this paper.
With these considerations in mind, party switching is coded as 1 if the legislator changed
party affiliation at any time during the legislative term and 0 otherwise.10 If a legislator
changed party and subsequently returned to the original party, she is coded as a party
9The authors demonstrate that multi-party systems have a greater potential to evolve between elections,
and office-seeking politicians gravitate toward large, dominant parties.
10A similar coding strategy is employed by O’Brien and Shomer (2013) in their dichotomous coding of
legislative parties that contained party switchers.
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Figure 1. Proportion of party-switching legislators by country
switcher. If a legislator dropped affiliation and remained a legislator as an independent, she
is also coded as a party switcher. In this dataset, 174 legislators (or 8.44% of the observations)
are party switchers. Figure 1 shows the distribution of switchers across the four countries in
this analysis. Approximately three percent of Canadian MPs and one percent of UK MPs
switched parties. The bulk of the switching occurred in New Zealand and Italy where about
eight and twenty percent of legislators switched parties, respectively.
4.2 Explanatory Variables
Vote-seeking is conceptualized as behavior exhibited by a legislator when she changes political
party affiliation because of doubts of winning reelection (or election, if seeking a different
elected position) with her current party affiliation. Because vote shares determine which
legislative candidates are awarded a parliamentary seat, it is reasonable to assume that this
percentage serves as a signal of electoral strength to a candidate. There are two measures
used for vote-seeking. The first measure is the legislator’s district level vote share. Holding
all else constant, legislators with low district level vote shares that switch parties can be
described as exhibiting vote-seeking behavior. In keeping with H1, there should be a negative
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association between this continuous variable and party switching. The second measure is
the national vote share of the legislator’s party.11 Similarly to the district level measure,
legislators of parties with low national vote shares that switch parties are characterized as
vote-seekers. Data for these variables were obtained through Adam Carr’s Election Archive
(2016), the New Zealand Election Study, and Italy’s Ministry of Internal Affairs website.
A legislator is office-seeking when decisions are made on the basis of acquiring more
prestigious or powerful positions within the legislature, such as a leadership position or
membership on certain politically lucrative committees. Because parties that control a leg-
islative chamber have more resources and control over such positions, office-seeking party
switchers are expected to change from a less politically influential party within the legisla-
ture to a party with more benefits. Office-seeking measurement is based on whether or not
a legislator is a member of a government party. Considering all countries in this analysis are
parliamentary, this variable is coded as 1 if the legislator’s affiliated party, at the time of the
election, formed part of the governing coalition formed immediately after the election and 0
otherwise. One would expect legislators who are members of the opposition, coded 0, to be
more likely to switch parties because those legislators already members of parties in charge
face little to no office-seeking incentives. Therefore, for H2 to be supported, there must be
a negative association between this dichotomous variable and party switching. Data were
acquired from the Parliament and Government Composition Database.
Party switching due to policy-seeking occurs when a legislator changes affiliation in the
pursuit of affecting a certain policy that is of particular importance to the legislator or her
constituents. Parties are vehicles through which policies are shaped in the legislature. I use
the ideological extremity of a legislator’s party in order to proxy the legislator’s capacity to
affect policy outcomes. More extreme parties, by definition, have less in common with the
remainder of the governing body and their members’ interests are less likely to overlap with
11For Italian legislators, the coding of party national vote share is determined by whether the MP was
elected via SMD or PR since there are two aggregate measures for the two ballots Italian voters cast in
elections.
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those that harness agenda-setting power. This reduces the ability of MPs in extreme parties
to impact or successfully pursue policy goals. To measure ideological extremity, I employ
the Manifesto Project Database’s right-left positioning of political parties on a scale of -100
(leftist) to 100 (rightist). I averaged the scores of each MP’s party and then calculated the
difference between each party’s CMP score and the average. The extremity variable is the
absolute value of this indicator so that higher values are associated with extremely leftist or
rightist parties and values closer to zero are associated with more centrist parties within the
contexts of each country’s ideological context. H3 suggests that there should be a positive
relationship between ideological extremity and party switching.
In addition to these motivational concerns, certain institutional features, both district
and system level, have been argued to have an effect on party switching. First, I use an
indicator for an MP’s seat type where SMD is coded 1 and PR is 0.12 Second, the effec-
tive number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) of each country is included in the analysis
(Gallagher, 1991; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008). This is preferential to the effective number
of electoral parties (ENEP) because I am focusing on party switching that occurs during a
legislative term. Another possible measure is to calculate the ENPP of each MP’s district.
While this is certainly a plausible measure and potentially superior, to avoid complications
with proportional tiers in mixed-member systems. The national ENPP remains a useful
measure for this analysis because it provides information on the competitiveness and com-
position of the national legislature where the party switching is observed. This continuous
variable measures the number of effective parties at the legislative level. H4 posits that there
should be a positive relationship between having an SMD seat and party switching while
H5 supposes a positive relationship between the number of parliamentary parties and party
switching.
12As an alternative, I employ district magnitude in a few models found in the appendix. These data were
also acquired through Carr (2016) and are log transformed (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Benoit, 2001).
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5 Cross-National Analysis
A binary logistic regression was conducted with robust standard errors clustered by country-
term.13 Table 1 displays the results. Model 1 includes only the vote-, office-, and policy-
seeking variables. Model 2 also includes the national vote share of the legislator’s party, seat
type (SMD), and ENPP. The interaction term between district and party level vote shares
posited by H1 is included in Model 3. A discussion of each model’s results follows.
Table 1. Logistic regression results with robust standard errors clustered by legislative term.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
District vote % −0.041∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Party national vote % − −0.029∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.038)
District % × Party % − − 0.002∗
(0.001)
In government 0.136 0.463∗ 0.395
(office-seeking) (0.235) (0.238) (0.268)
Party ideological extremity 0.022∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.018∗
(policy-seeking) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
SMD − 1.484∗∗∗ 1.998∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.621)
ENPP − 0.495∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.132)
Constant −1.082∗∗∗ −3.351∗∗∗ −2.332∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.853) (0.674)
AIC 1056 962 953
Log Likelihood -524 -475 -470
N observations 1992 1991 1991
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
13The appendix contains models with alternative measures, results with each country removed from a
model, in addition to multilevel and rare events logit models.
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Model 1 provides strong statistical support for both H1 and H3. Higher district level
vote shares are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a legislator switching parties.
Also, legislators in more ideologically extreme parties are more likely to change affiliations.
Office-seeking does not receive support from this model.
With party vote shares, the SMD indicator, and ENPP added, Model 2 demonstrates
that the support found for H1 and H3 persists. Furthermore, party vote shares are highly
statistically significant and negative, as expected. MP’s with SMD seats are significantly and
positively associated with party switching, lending support to H4. ENPP has a significant
and positive relationship with party switching. Office-seeking achieves statistical significance
but in an unexpected direction which does not support the idea that legislators in government
are more likely to switch than governing MPs.
Of the three models, the third, which includes an interaction between district and party
vote shares, fits the data the best. It provides the strongest support for both the motivational
and institutional hypotheses. Multimember districts, membership of less extreme parties,
and lower ENPP are all associated with a lower likelihood of party switching. Overall, all
hypotheses but H2 receive support across all models. The interaction and party ideological
extremity closely miss the 0.05 level of significance. One possible reason why office-seeking
fails to obtain statistical significance and the expected sign is the fact that Italy’s governing
coalition fell midway through the legislative term so that some legislators coded as in an
opposition party were part of the government in the second half of the term.
Figures 2 and 3 display the interaction between district and party vote shares for legisla-
tors elected via vote shares characteristic of MMDs and SMDs, respectively.14 This allows for
the interpretation of the interaction with vote shares for both seat types found in the dataset.
For example, the average district level vote share for a PR legislator is 19.3% compared to
50.2% for SMD legislators. Likewise, the average party vote share for PR legislators is 18.6%
and 34.4% for SMD legislators. Because of these large differences, I thought it appropriate
14All figures generated using Model 3 in Table 1.
21
to separate legislators for the purposes of the visualization of the interaction so that suitable
vote shares could be used in each example (10 and 30% for PR and 30 and 60% for SMD).15
This allows for a more representative depiction of the data used in this analysis.
Figure 2. Predicted probability legislators switching parties by district vote share over party vote share
Note: ENPP set to 5.1 — the average ENPP among MPs with PR seats. All other variables held at their
means. 95% confidence intervals shown. Average marginal effects of party vote share with 30% district vote
share: -0.050, 0.016 S.E. Average marginal effects of party vote share with 10% district vote share: -0.082,
0.030 S.E.
Figure 2 shows that, at low levels of a party’s national vote share (up until around 15%)
there are statistically distinguishable differences between PR legislators that received 10%
and 30% of the district vote share.16 Those legislators with the smallest district vote shares
are more likely to switch parties than those with greater district vote shares. A legislator
with 10% of the district vote share and whose party obtained 10% of the votes cast on the PR
ballot at the national level, with all other variables held at their means (party in government
and a ±13 contextualized party platform), has about a 0.7 predicted probability of switching
parties. Under the same conditions, a legislator with 30% of the district vote has about a
15These percentages reflect the average district vote shares for PR and SMD legislators and approximately
a standard deviation above and below the mean (or two standard deviations below for in the case of SMD).
16This apparent 15% threshold applies to Italian PR MPs from the RI, CCD-CDU, PSPUP, RC, and LN
parties or party alliances included in this analysis that all received seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies
on party lists while their party acquired less than 15% of the vote share in their districts. This also applies
to New Zealand’s ACT, Alliance, NZF, United, and Green parties in the 1996 and 1005 elections.
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0.37 probability of party switching. A decrease from 30% to 10% of the district vote share
under these circumstances sees nearly a doubling of the probability of switching, going from
more likely to not switch to more likely to switch.
Figure 3. Predicted probability of legislators switching parties by district vote share over party vote share
Note: ENPP set to 3.4 — the average ENPP among MPs with SMD seats. All other variables held at their
means. 95% confidence intervals shown. Average marginal effects of party vote share with 60% district vote
share: -0.002, 0.017 S.E. Average marginal effects of party vote share with 30% district vote share: -0.050,
0.016 S.E.
Turning to SMD legislators, Figure 3 displays a similar relationship shown in Figure
2. While the confidence intervals overlap to a greater degree in Figure 3, there remains a
distinguishable difference between SMD legislators that received 30% and 60% of the district
vote share at fairly low levels of a party’s national vote share (around 15% in this case as
well).17 SMD legislators with lower district vote shares are more likely to switch than those
with greater vote shares. This makes intuitive sense because the margin of victory for those
legislators with 60% of the district vote share in SMDs is much greater than those legislators
who managed to win a seat with 30% and would be less likely to switch due to vote-seeking
motives. Overall, the figures portray the negative relationship between both district and
party vote shares and party switching.
17This applies to SMD legislators elected in Italy’s RC, LN, and Comunista parties, New Zealand’s NLP,
NZF, and ACT and the UK’s DUP, SF, PC, SDLP, UUP, UKU, UKIP, and SNP.
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Figure 4. Predicted probability and margins of party switching by seat type
Note: 95% confidence intervals shown.
To better illustrate the differences between legislators elected in SMDs and MMDs, Figure
4 shows SMD MPs are significantly much more likely to switch parties than PR legislators.
SMD legislators are approximately twice as likely or more to switch than PR legislators.
This suggests legislators in electoral systems more candidate-centered with decentralized
candidate selection procedures and greater incentives for personal vote cultivation and easier
credit claiming are also more likely to engage in party switching. Likewise, in systems where
party leaders possess a great deal of influence over the political futures of MPs, legislators
are less likely to switch since such risky behavior may not viewed positively by the receiving
party of a switcher.
Lastly, Figure 5 displays the effect of ENPP on party switching. There is a clear positive
relationship between the two variables. With all other variables held at their means, a
legislator in a party system with six effective parliamentary parties is over twice as likely
to switch parties than an MP in a party system with only two parliamentary parties. This
supports the notion that more parties in a party system provide more options and alternatives
for legislators to consider when choosing to maintain or change their party affiliation. The
findings of these last two figures should not be viewed as contradictory. Two of the countries
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Figure 5. Predicted probability of party switching over ENPP
Note: All other variables held at their means. 95% confidence intervals shown.
included in this analysis are mixed-member systems — Italy and New Zealand.18 While this
may be viewed as a limitation of this study, research on or including mixed-member systems
are becoming increasingly relevant as this type of political system has been adopted in more
countries over the past few decades.
18One model included in the appendix includes a control for mixed-member systems.
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6 Discussion
The analysis in this paper provides support for the vote-seeking and policy-seeking mo-
tivational hypotheses of legislative party switching. These results hold with the inclu-
sion/exclusion of country fixed effects and institutional variables. Both district and party
vote shares are negatively associated with party switching. Legislators who are members
of ideologically extreme parties are more likely to change parties than legislators of more
centrist parties. The analysis failed to find support for office-seeking motivations. Perhaps
legislators from minor parties that form the government switch to the dominating party in
the coalition which could be argued to also represent office-seeking behavior. Alternatively,
the particular sample used may have a higher than average rate of new party formation.
The institutional variables of seat type and ENPP have been shown to be not only
significantly but substantively important for explaining party switching. Both SMD seats
and ENPP are positively related to party switching. Furthermore, the results show that
institutional features are worth exploring if one is attempting to explain legislative party
switching at the individual level.
Research on legislative party switching conducted thus far has been dominated by case
studies. While their contributions are inarguable, cross-national analyses allow the testing of
the relationship between this phenomena and institutional variables as well as how they may
interact with the conventional motivational hypotheses. As one of the few cross-national
papers on party switching, and the only to do so with a dataset containing individual-level
legislator observations, the findings presented herein have broadened the questions that can
be answered and has introduced new questions to be considered in future research. Perhaps
certain institutional arrangements enhance or diminish the vote-, office-, and policy-seeking
goals of politicians and therefore more interactive effects should be explored. One interest-
ing avenue to further investigate and perhaps reveal the precise causal mechanism behind
seat type and party switching is to consider the role of ballot type and partly list position and
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whether it may interact with seat type. Both case studies and a cross-national approach
can be useful in the attempt to discern these potential relationships.
Research on the negative externalities of party switching would assist in the elucidation
of a legislator’s calculus of party affiliation. Considering the decision to change parties
certainly comes with its share of costs and uncertainty, more research should focus on the
pay-offs of such a risky political move. If party-switchers are indeed vote- and policy-seekers,
does switching parties actually assist them in achieving their goals? Scholars have begun
to address the degree to which party-switching impacts a legislator’s chances of reelection
and/or increasing vote shares. Thus far, the evidence is mixed. More research using a diverse
set of methodological tools is needed to reveal the nature of this relationship. A key actor
frequently left out of scholars’ reach and therefore their analyses is the leader of a party
receiving a defector of another party. In this study, it is merely assumed party leaders would
view party switchers behavior as a risky investment. Both the electoral and the bureaucratic
costs of party switching should be analyzed in future research.
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7 New Zealand Case Study
How do electoral rules impact legislative party switching behavior and how is this behav-
ior impacted by changes to these rules? Party switching is a relatively understudied phe-
nomenon. As a result, scholars of legislatures and political parties do not have a firm grasp
of its prevalence. Information accumulated through the execution of dozens of single-country
case studies undergird this body of literature.19 Outside these case studies of countries with
high occurrences of party switching, it is believed that party switching is a rarity (Desposato,
2006; Heller and Mershon, 2008). However, a recent study shows that party switching occurs
more frequently and more broadly than the literature suggests. O’Brien and Shomer (2013)
have found that among the 239 political parties they examined, nearly one-third have ex-
perienced party switching behavior and fourteen of the twenty countries analyzed witnessed
some degree of switching.
One of the main reasons party switching has been understudied is that it is often dismissed
as simply an indicator of weak party discipline or that political parties are inconsequential
in countries where switching is not an abnormality. However, changes in politicians’ party
affiliations are important for a number of reasons, first of which is that it clearly demon-
strates political parties do matter (Desposato, 2006). Legislators would not risk the costs of
party switching if parties did not offer some form of benefit. Additionally, party switching
offers insight into the preferences and incentives politicians have for belonging to certain
parties, such as the financial and human resources they provide during a campaign, access
to government funds and power over its distribution, as well as how parties facilitate the
enactment of policies. Scholars show that parties exert vast amounts of influence over the
future career of a member legislator (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984; Gaines and Garrett,
19Some of the more notable case studies conducted include those on the countries of Brazil (Mainwaring
and Perez-Linan, 1997; Desposato, 2006, 2009), Ecuador (Mejia-Acosta, 2004), Italy (Heller and Mershon,
2008; Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008; Virgilio, Giannetti and Pinto, 2012), Japan (Desposato and Scheiner,
2008), Mexico (Barrow, 2007; Kerevel, 2014), Poland (McMenamin and Gwiazda, 2011; Zielinski, Slomczynski
and Shabad, 2005), Russia (Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008), South Africa (McLaughlin, 2011), and Taiwan
(Fell, 2014), to name a few.
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1993; Taylor, 1992). Furthermore, a candidate’s party affiliation sends informational signals
to voters. Legislators who switch parties during a legislative term introduce a normative
concern over the functioning of democracy.
Missing from previous scholarship is an investigation of party switching behavior over a
series of terms with different electoral rules within the context of the same country. New
Zealand provides a unique opportunity not afforded by other case studies in that significant
changes to its electoral system were enacted. The country offers a timeline where legislative
behavior can be examined in a variety of environments: a term when MPs were elected
through the longstanding SMD rules, one when MPs knew the details of the rule change
and date of implementation but were still elected via SMD, a term with mixed member
(MM) electoral rules, and a term under the same MM rules immediately after a ban on
party switching expired. This is significant because other studies on electoral rules and/or
their changes and party switching often examine only one term (Heller and Mershon, 2005).
This may be problematic for if the explanation of why party switching increases immediately
following changes in rules includes uncertainty or the electoral rules themselves, it is difficult
to formulate a compelling test that does not incorporate subsequent terms. An analysis of
New Zealand may provide the leverage needed to determine whether the new rules lead to
party switching or if uncertainty initiated by the change in rules creates a period of instability
of legislative party labels.
This study utilizes New Zealand’s institutional changes in order to investigate the research
question at hand. The next section of the paper provides background on New Zealand
and a review of the literature on party switching. I also develop a theory and testable
hypotheses of how electoral rules impact party switching. The second section provides a
brief description of the data and methods to be used in the analysis. The third section
includes preliminary results and the final section concludes. Evidence suggests that the
change to a MM electoral system is associated with a rise in the frequency of legislative
party switching in New Zealand’s House of Representatives. Additionally, the results of
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this study provide evidence that party switching legislators are motivated by vote-seeking
concerns over reelection.
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8 Party Switching and Electoral Rules
8.1 Why New Zealand?
New Zealand has had a parliamentary government consisting of democratic representation
since the mid-19th century and gained its independence from the British Crown in 1947.
Its upper house was abolished in 1951 and consequently operated under a unicameral leg-
islature. While party discipline has not always been a feature of New Zealand’s House of
Representatives, it became the norm for a majority of the 20th century (Malone, 2008).
This norm is due in part to the small number of seats in the legislature. The governing
party usually held such a small majority of seats that there was no allowance for intra-party
disagreements and defection. Additionally, the chamber’s small size enabled leaders to have
frequent intimate meetings with its members in order to promote voting unity and party
cohesion. Party switching was essentially non-existent.
Since the 1930s, New Zealand’s two major parties, Labour and National, alternated con-
trol of the legislature and prime ministership much like the U.S. Congress changes from
Democratic to Republican control (Karp et al., 2002; Karp, 2009). In 1989, New Zealand
witnessed its first party switcher in recorded history after Labour MP James Anderton
voted against a bill supported by his party. He was expelled from the caucus and decided
to form his own party, New Labour. During the 1980s, New Zealand faced multiple crises
in the forms of stagflation, balance of payments deficits, and foreign debt. Because of the
first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules, governments consisted of a single party. New
Zealand’s weak separation of powers combined with one-party rule gave a disproportionate
amount of power to the cabinet. Parliament had very little power to override the cabinet’s
agenda which proved to be contentious during the economic difficulties of the 1980s and
early 1990s (Boston et al., 1996; Denemark, 2001). The Labour party governed from 1984-
1990 and the National party resumed control thereafter. Both parties implemented their own
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neo-liberal agendas to the dismay of the populace and fellow MPs who had little sway
over policy (Malone, 2008).
The origins of New Zealand’s mixed member proportional (MMP) system dates back to
1986 when a government commission on the electoral system published a report that endorsed
a MMP. The National party pledged to conduct a referendum on the electoral system if it was
voted into power in parliament (Boston et al., 1996). After their electoral victory, the party
leaders had no choice but to deliver on their campaign promise and passed the Electoral
Referendum Act 1991 (Denemark, 2001). The results of this two item referendum was that
84.7% of voters were in favor of abandoning the FPTP rules. The second question identified
MMP as the preferential electoral system with 70.5% of the vote. In the general election of
1993, a binding referendum was held with much greater turnout. Although the results were
the same, the margin between supporters and opponents of MMP was significantly closer
(53.9% in favor and 46.1% opposed) (Malone, 2008). The new electoral rules were set to go
into effect in the 1996 general election. Table 2 summarizes the timeline of New Zealand’s
change to pure SMD to MMP electoral rules.
Table 2. Summary of the evolution of New Zealand’s electoral rules
Legislative term Electoral rules
1990-1993 FPTP rules
1993-1996 FPTP rules with incoming change to MMP in the next election
1996-1999 MMP rules, districts redrawn, and 20 more seats added
1999-2002 MMP rules, switching banned in 2001
2002-2005 MMP rules, switching ban in effect
2005-2008 MMP rules, switching ban expired
New Zealand is ideal for studying how legislators utilize or do not utilize party switching
in the face of institutional changes. In the legislative behavior literature, party switching
has been dismissed as being a symptom of fluid party systems and weakly institutionalized
parties. However, given New Zealand’s history with democracy and entrenched parties, this
particular case selection could provide better insight into alternative contexts where party
switching may arise. Furthermore, this case allows for the exploration of business as usual
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under pure SMD/FPTP rules, the investigation of party switching during a term where all
legislators knew the change to MMP was to be implemented in the next election, and a
term after the change to MMP rules. Legislative party switching in New Zealand’s House
of Representatives was banned in 2001 because of its excessive frequency. This ban was
allowed to expire in 2005. In fact, party switching during the 1990s became so prevalent
that the phenomenon was colloquially termed by New Zealanders as “waka-jumping” where
the Maori word “waka” roughly translates into “ship.” Table 3 shows the election results
for each party from 1987 until 2005. It also displays the effective number of electoral and
parliamentary parties during this time period.20 The increases and fluctuations in these two
measures are the result of the electoral rules changes (Barker et al., 2001; Boston et al.,
1996).
8.2 Legislative Party Switching in New Zealand
In keeping with previous scholarship on legislative behavior, I assume that legislators are
rational, utility-maximizing individuals with preferences (Laver and Benoit, 2003). Their
decisions are based on cost-benefit analyses, including decisions regarding party affiliation.
Legislative party membership is associated with both costs and payoffs that are taken into
account while a legislator continuously reviews the decision to switch parties during a leg-
islative term (Cox, 1987).
Most studies on legislative decision-making focus on the motivations that influence politi-
cians. Drawing from the literature on American legislative politics, one can assume that
legislators desire a number of things. Most of this literature is built on the scholarly work
of Mayhew (1974) in his seminal book on the electoral connection which conceives of legis-
lators in the U.S. House as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” However, studies of the
electoral connection beyond the context of the United States has determined that this is not
necessarily a cross-national characteristic of legislators. Samuels (2003) demonstrates that
20These data were obtained from Gallagher (2015).
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Table 3. New Zealand general election results: 1987-2005
Party 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Labour 48.0 35.1 34.7 28.2 38.7 41.3 41.1
National 44.0 47.8 35.1 33.8 30.5 20.9 39.1
New Zealand First − − 8.4 13.4 4.3 10.4 5.7
Green − 6.8∗ † 0.1∗ 6.1 7.0 5.3
ACT − − − 6.2 7.0 7.1 1.5
Alliance − − 18.2 10.1 7.7 1.3∗ 0.1∗
United − − − 0.9 0.5 − −
United Future − − − − − 6.7 2.7
Democrat 5.7∗ 1.7∗ † † † ‡ 0.1∗
Mana Motuhake 0.5∗ 0.6∗ † † − − −
New Zealand 0.3∗ − − − − − −
New Labour − 5.2 † † † − −
Jim Anderton’s Progressives − − − − − 1.7 1.2
Maori − − − − − − 2.1
Others 1.5 2.8 3.6 7.3 5.2 3.6 1.1
ENEP 2.34 2.77 3.52 4.27 3.86 4.17 3.04
ENPP 1.94 1.74 2.16 3.76 3.45 3.76 2.98
Notes: Percentages shown. For elections in 1996 and thereafter, results are from the party list ballot.
Asterisks (*) indicate party received no seats in the legislature. † denotes the party was included in a
coalition with the Alliance and ‡ denotes a coalition with Jim Anderton’s Progressives.
federalism in Brazil discourages members of the Chamber of Deputies from seeking reelec-
tion and incentivizes them to seek subnational offices. Jones and colleagues (2002) find a
similar relationship in Argentina. Fenno (1973) characterizes legislators as individuals that
seek to maximize their electoral support, increase prestige and power within the legislature
or advance to a higher office, and affect public policy. These vote-, office-, and policy-seeking
goals, respectively, factor into the calculus of legislators’ decision-making and have been uti-
lized to explain legislative behavior around the world (Giannetti and Laver, 2001; Heller and
Mershon, 2005, 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008; Shomer, 2009).
In order to pursue their vote-, office-, and policy-seeking goals, legislators utilize parties
for their resources. Scholars have demonstrated how the political party is a vehicle for
legislators to achieve these goals (Aldrich, 2011; Aldrich and Bianco, 1992; Mu¨ller and Strom,
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1999; Nokken, 2000; Thames, 2007). One can assume that if legislators utilize parties to
obtain their goals, they can also use party switching behavior as a strategy to the same
end. A new and growing body of work within legislative studies relaxes the assumption that
parties are unitary actors whose legislative membership bases are permanent from election
to election. Recent scholarship emphasizes the role of legislators within political parties as
individuals who engage in strategic interaction to achieve their own ambitions and preferences
(Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2008).
Heller and Mershon argue that party switching is a “natural consequence of political
ambition” and a reaction to party discipline (2008, p. 910). If party discipline is an ob-
stacle to a politician’s preferential outcome, whether it be pursuing a certain policy or vote
maximization to increase reelection certainty, the politician has an incentive to switch par-
ties. Numerous case studies find support for these expectations.21 One study has shown a
relationship between the type of behavior that is exhibited by a legislator and the tempo-
ral placement within a legislative cycle. Mershon and Shvetsova (2013) have demonstrated
that as elections draw nearer, legislators are deterred from party switching, especially in
candidate-centered electoral systems. Another study shows that subnational elections serve
as signals of a party’s electoral strength during a legislative term and temporally coincides
with party switching activity (Heller and Mershon, 2005). All of these studies indicate leg-
islators often engage in strategic behavior with political parties in order to maximize their
chances of obtaining their goals. Table 4 contains a list of each party switcher in New Zealand
from 1987-1999 and 2005-2008. The list includes their party affiliation at the time of their
election and the party they switched to during the legislative term.
If politicians utilize parties in order to achieve a preferred outcome, it follows that party
switching is a strategy they can use to pursue their goals provided there is no ban on the
activity within the legislature.22 Operating under the assumption that legislative party
21See Desposato (2006); Mershon and Shvetsova (2008); Reed and Scheiner (2003).
22See Janda (2009).
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Table 4. List of party switchers by term
Term MP Elected Party Party Switched To
1987-1990 James Anderton Labour New Labour
1990-1993 James Anderton New Labour Alliance
Hamish MacIntyre National Alliance
Gilbert Myles National New Zealand First
Winston Peters National New Zealand First
Cameron Campion National Independent
1993-1996 Clive Matthewson Labour United
Jack Elder Labour New Zealand First
Peter Dunne Labour United
Margaret Austin Labour United
Peter Hilt National United
Michael Laws National New Zealand First
Peter McCardle National New Zealand First
Alan Meurant National Conservative
Trevor Rodgers National Conservative
Graeme Lee National Christian Democrats
Bruce Cliffe National United
John Robertson National United
Pauline Gardiner National United
1996-1999 Rod Donald Alliance Green
Jeanette Fitzsimons Alliance Green
Frank Grover Alliance Christian Heritage
Alemein Kopu Alliance Mana Wahine
Rana Waitai New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Tuku Morgan New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
John Delamere New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Tau Henare New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Ann Batten New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Jack Elder New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Peter McCardle New Zealand First Mauri Pacific
Deborah Morris New Zealand First Independent
2005-2008 Taito Phillip Field Labour Pacific
Gordon Copeland United Kiwi
Notes: Italics denote repeat switchers. Bold text indicates MP acquired a seat in a by-election and is
excluded from the statistical analysis in this paper.
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switching is legal within a country, the literature presents three plausible explanations for
why a legislator might change party affiliations: to maximize votes (vote-seeking), obtain
political advancement or power (office-seeking), or to affect policy change (policy-seeking).23
While it is safe to assume all legislators have one or more of these goals, these goals are
hierarchical in nature. If a legislator desires to affect policy, she must be in a position of
power to do so. Furthermore, if a legislator desires this powerful position to affect policy or
just the position in its own right, one must maintain her seat in parliament. If this is the
case, legislators should exhibit vote-seeking behavior if they so choose to use party switching
as a strategy. This leads to the formation of the following hypothesis:
H1: Legislators from parties that perform well electorally are less likely to switch
parties.
For party switching specifically in New Zealand with the change in its electoral rules, it
is reasonable to assume it likely that reelection concerns are prioritized over office-seeking
and policy-seeking goals. If H1 is supported, one would expect that the changes in rules
would have an impact on party-switching behavior. This is so because before the change,
New Zealand’s parliament consisted of 99 members elected in SMD.24 After the changes,
the parliament was expanded to a standard 120 members with 65 elected via SMD and 55
through compensatory PR (Malone, 2008). The increase in the number of seats and the
compensatory nature of the PR portion likely increased election prospects for some legis-
lators. However, this means that district lines had to be redrawn, with numerous districts
merged together, and many MPs became increasingly uncertain of their reelection chances.
One would expect those MPs that were confident to maintain their party affiliation while
others may switch parties or form new parties to increase their probability of reelection.
23See Aldrich (2011); Desposato (2006); Fenno (1973); Nokken (2000); Reed and Scheiner (2003).
24The exact number of seats in New Zealand’s House of Representatives before the electoral reform varies
over time.
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With the arrival of the MMP electoral system, candidates could simultaneously run for
election in a district and on the party list. In the first MMP election in 1996, 50 of the 120
successful candidates were on both SMD and party list ballots. This number increased to 61
in the 2005 election results. Candidates who win via SMD ballot do not owe their electoral
success to their party to the same degree as their party list colleagues. These candidates
are in a better position to engage in constituency services and credit claim for funding in
their district and the passage of popular bills than PR legislators. PR legislators are selected
at the national compensatory tier where the district “border” is the entire country and the
“district magnitude” is 55. Since many of these PR legislators ran for election in an SMD
and lost, chances are they must look to their party for electoral support in the next election.
For these reasons, I expect legislators who hold an SMD seat are more likely to switch parties
than their PR counterparts.
H2: Legislators elected via party list are less likely to switch parties.
Research has shown that systems with candidate centered rules, such as FPTP and SMD,
encourage personal vote cultivation and intra-party competition. This leads to less party
unity. Conversely, party-centered rules, such as closed-list PR, increase the importance of
party loyalty and leads to party cohesion (Carey, 2007). However, the change from pure
SMD to MMP is associated with a drastic increase in the amount of party switching (Heller
and Mershon, 2008). Various studies note that some countries have party systems that are
fluid and weakly institutionalized (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999;
Ames, 2001). With few or no incentives for party loyalty, one might expect party switching
to be more prevalent in these countries.25 Yet New Zealand is a long established democracy
that has been historically dominated by two highly institutionalized parties. Party switch-
ing increased from before the electoral rules referendum and after the implementation of
25However, the extant literature does not provide a clear consensus on the impact party cohesion and
discipline may have on party switching (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2005; O’Brien and Shomer,
2013).
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MMP (Barker et al., 2001). This leads me to suspect that changes in electoral rules creates
uncertainty surrounding legislators’ reelection prospects and may contribute to more party
switching.26 Because legislators require time to learn and adjust to new or altered rules, I
posit that uncertainty can account for an increase in party switching.
H3: The number of legislative party switchers will be higher after the transition
to MMP electoral rules compared to pure SMD rules.
Other scholars have argued that party switching is most prevalent under circumstances
of heightened uncertainty (Aldrich and Bianco, 1992). In their analysis of party switching
in Italy from 1996-2001, Heller and Mershon (2005) note the extreme levels of uncertainty
surrounding politics during the 1990s produced from numerous sources: corruption and
scandals, increased voter volatility, and changes in electoral laws, to name a few. This
uncertainty blurred party labels to the point where legislators experienced uncertainty about
parties’ preferred policies which made it increasingly difficult for MPs to align with both
their party and their voting constituents. However, this finding in Italy is somewhat at
tension with a study conducted on the timing of party switches using data from the same
legislative term. Mershon and Shvetsova (2008) demonstrate that Italian MPs switched
parties at times that coincided with subnational elections that served as indication of party
performance. MPs can use these elections to gauge party popularity and their own reelection
chances. One could argue that these elections reduce uncertainty. Compared to Italy, the
source of New Zealand’s changes and societal fluctuations are limited to the changes in the
country’s electoral rules. Therefore, it is much easier to isolate the uncertainty the changes
caused in New Zealand than the electoral reforms undertaken in Italy. It is possible both the
changes in the rules as well as the new rules themselves contribute to more party switching
simultaneously.
26This rests on the assumption that legislators are vote-seekers which will be tested within the context of
H1.
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9 New Zealand Data and Measurement
In order to test the above stated hypotheses, I use an original dataset of 439 individual-
level observations of legislators in New Zealand’s House of Representatives for four terms:
1990-1993, 1993-1996, 1996-1999, and 2005-2008.27 These data were gathered from govern-
ment archival websites, New Zealand’s official elections results, and the New Zealand Elec-
tion Study (NZES). This was supplemented by John M. Carey’s Legislative Voting Project
(Carey, 2016). I provide results of logistic regression models with robust standard errors
clustered by legislative term as well as some descriptive data to begin testing H3.28
9.1 Dependent Variable: Party Switching
A party switch is defined as “any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a
politician holding or competing for elective office” (Heller and Mershon, 2009, p. 8). For
the purposes of this paper, party switching is coded as 1 if the legislator changed party
affiliation at any time during the legislative term and 0 otherwise.29 If a legislator changed
party and subsequently returned to the original party or dropped affiliation and remained in
parliament as an independent, she is coded as a party switcher. In the dataset used in this
manuscript, 32 of the 439 legislators (or 7.29% of the observations) are party switchers.
9.2 Explanatory Variable: Vote-Seeking
Vote-seeking is conceptualized as behavior exhibited by a legislator when she changes political
party affiliation because of doubts of winning reelection with her current party affiliation.
Because vote shares determine which legislative candidates are awarded a parliamentary
27Previous terms have been excluded because party switching did not occur. The ban on party switching
was in effect during the 1999-2002 and 2002-2005 terms and were not included for the same reason as earlier
terms.
28Additional tests using rare events and multilevel models are in the appendix. Descriptive statistics are
located in the appendix as well.
29(O’Brien and Shomer, 2013) utilize a similar coding strategy in their dichotomous coding of legislative
parties that contained party switchers.
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seat, it is reasonable to assume that this percentage serves as a signal of electoral strength
to a candidate. For this analysis, I use a district-level measure of electoral strength. In the
1990-1993 and 1993-1996 terms, where all members are elected in SMD, each value is the
vote share the MP received in his or her district. In the 1996-1999 and 2005-2008 terms,
voters cast two ballots: one for their district candidate and another for the party list. Many
MPs with PR seats also ran unsuccessfully in a district. In this case, their district vote share
is the percentage of votes they received in the district in which they contested. For those
MPs on the party list only, their district vote share takes on the value of the vote share their
party received on the national party list ballot since their “district” is the entire country.
Depending on which method is responsible for an MPs seat, I use the party’s vote share from
the respective ballot vote totals. In keeping with H1, there should be a negative association
between this continuous variable and party switching.
In addition to this measure, I also include a party-level measure of vote share in one
model. Depending on which method is responsible for an MPs seat, I use the party’s vote
share from the respective ballot vote totals. For example, all members of party A with
an SMD seat have the same value which matches the share of the vote all of party A’s
candidates in SMDs received. All legislators with PR seats in party A have the vote share
party A received on the party list ballot.
9.3 Control Variables
In this analysis, I control for several characteristics. I use a dichotomous measure for whether
or not the legislator’s party formed the government or was part of the governing coalition
immediately after the election. This takes the value of 1 if it did and 0 otherwise. This is
a common proxy for office-seeking in the party-switching legislature. Data for this indicator
were obtained from ParlGov.
Another behavior often included in analyses is policy-seeking. Party switching due to
policy-seeking occurs when a legislator changes affiliation in the pursuit of affecting a certain
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policy that is of particular importance to the legislator or her constituents. Parties are
vehicles through which policies are shaped in the legislature. I use the ideological extremity
of a legislator’s party in order to proxy the legislator’s capacity to affect policy outcomes.
More extreme parties, by definition, have less in common with the remainder of the governing
body and their members’ interests are less likely to overlap with those that harness agenda-
setting power. Because bills require a majority of the vote, it is less likely that extreme parties
can garner the support needed to enact their policy agenda. This reduces the ability of MPs
in extreme parties to impact or successfully pursue policy goals. To measure ideological
extremity, I employ the Manifesto Project Database’s right-left positioning of political parties
on a scale of -100 (leftist) to 100 (rightist). I use the absolute value of this indicator so that
higher values are associated with extremely leftist or rightist parties and values closer to
zero are associated with more centrist parties. This is a departure from the literature on
party switching in that a measure of party cohesion, such as party Rice scores, is often used
as a proxy for policy-seeking (O’Brien and Shomer, 2013). However, due to the lack of a
clear link between party cohesion and discipline with party switching, I utilize an alternative
measure that can capture policy-seeking aims.
Lastly, I use a categorical variable for ballot type where 1 indicates an MP only appeared
on an SMD ballot in a district, 2 indicates an MP only appeared on the party list, and 3
indicates a legislator appeared on both an SMD ballot and on the party list. In keeping
with H2, those legislators who only appeared on the SMD ballot should be the most likely
to switch and those only on the party list should be the least likely to switch.
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10 New Zealand Analysis
The results presented in Table 9 show five models. The samples of the first two are separated
based on the term analyzed: Model 4 includes the 1990-1993 and 1993-1996 legislative terms
— the portion of the data set with MPs from before the implementation of MMP rules—
and Model 5 includes the 1996-1999 and 2005-2008 terms under MMP.30
Table 5. Logistic regression results on legislative party switching in New Zealand with robust standard











District vote share (%) −0.102∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.029
(vote-seeking) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.228)
Party vote share (%) − − − − −0.087∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.039)
In government 0.305 2.974∗ 2.022∗∗ 1.776∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗
(0.479) (1.777) (1.002) (0.697) (0.800)
Party ideological extremity −0.103 0.086 0.062 0.035 0.035∗
(0.110) (0.076) (0.038) (0.023) (0.018)
SMD − 1.741∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ − −
(0.397) (0.366)
Ballot type †
Party list only − − − −2.624∗∗∗ −3.093∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.166)
Both SMD and Party list − − − −1.444∗∗∗ −2.070∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.122)
Constant 2.976∗ −4.200 −1.960 −0.831 0.163
(1.722) (3.670) (1.416) (1.308) (0.525)
AIC 106.6 85.3 195.7 204.3 192.4
Log Likelihood -52.3 -41.6 -94.9 -99.2 -93.2
N observations 197 240 437 437 437
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
† = excluded category is SMD electorate ballot only and ‡ = excluded category is Pre-referendum.
30Due to a reduced number of observations and collinearity, the 1990-1993 and 1993-1996 legislative terms
could not be separated for statistical analysis. See the appendix for these models with omitted variables.
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In the model 4, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the
district vote shares of a legislator and the likelihood of a legislator switching parties. After the
transition to MMP, as shown in Model 5, this relationship holds and statistically significant
positive relationships emerge between a legislator being a member of a party in government
or holding an SMD seat and party switching. Both of these models support H1 in that
greater district vote shares reduces the likelihood an MP will change party affiliation. While
being in government is significant in the second model, it is in the opposite direction the
literature suggests it should be. This is probably due to the fracturing of the established
party system and the formation of numerous smaller parties during the transition to MMP.
Lastly, SMD legislators appear to be more likely to switch than PR legislators which supports
H2.
The following three models pool each of the terms and include robust standard errors
clustered by legislative term. Model 6 simply replicates model 5 with the full sample. In
this model, the vote-seeking hypothesis is support with a highly significant and negative
association between party switching and district vote shares. Legislators that received more
votes are less likely to change party affiliations. Once again, MPs from parties in government
are more likely to switch parties than those legislators that are members of the opposition.
This is both substantively and statistically significant and opposes the expectation of office-
seeking as predicated on the literature. The SMD indicator remains strong and highly
significant, indicating support for H2.
Model 7 removes the SMD indicator and adds the ballot type categorical variable with
the SMD only category as the omitted reference category. This model continues to support
H1. Ballot type appears to be an important indicator of party switching. Appearing only
on the party list or on both party list and an SMD ballot significantly reduces the likelihood
a legislator will switch parties compared to those MPs who run for election only in an SMD
electorate. Model 8 simply adds the party-level vote share to the model. Interestingly, with
both the district-level and the party-level included in the same model, only the party-level
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vote share is significant which suggests party electoral performance is more important in
legislators’ decision-making calculus to switch parties or keep their party affiliation. Addi-
tionally, this is the only model in which the policy-seeking measure of ideological extremity
achieve statistical significance and in the expected direction. The results from Models 7 and
8 support the expectation that legislators elected via PR, party-centered rules are less likely
to switch than their SMD counterparts. In model 8, dual-listed MPs are statistically distin-
guishable from one another meaning SMD only MPs are the most likely to switch and party
list only MPs are the least likely to switch with those legislators on both ballots occupying
some likelihood in between the two.
Across all five models, vote shares are negatively associated with party switching which
lends a fair amount of support to the vote-seeking hypothesis. Additionally, this is the only
motivational hypothesis advanced in the literature that obtains significance across all models.
Figure 6. Predicted probability of party switching by ballot type over vote shares
Note: All other variables held at their means. 95% confidence intervals shown. Generated using Model 6.
Figure 6 shows the negative relationship between district vote shares and party switching
for a legislator with an SMD seat and with a PR seat. Regardless of electoral rules, legislators
with higher district vote shares are less likely to switch parties than those with lower vote
shares. An MP elected from a district is substantially more likely to switch than a PR
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Figure 7. Predicted probability of party switching by ballot type over vote shares
Note: 95% confidence intervals shown. Generated using Model 8.
legislator, although the difference between the two groups becomes indistinguishable from
zero once district vote shares exceed roughly 47%. However, it should be noted that there
are very few empirical examples from the dataset that would be plotted in this area. An
SMD legislator is predicted to transition from being more likely to switch to less likely to
switch when she acquires around 20% of the district’s vote.
Figure 7 portrays the probability of switching associated with each ballot type along
with their confidence intervals. The graph shows the difference between the predicted prob-
abilities in party switching of an MP who was exclusively on a district ballot compared to
an MP exclusively on the party list ballot. Legislators that were only on SMD ballots are
substantially more likely to switch parties than those MPs that were only on the party list.
While it is difficult to determine in the figure, party list only MPs and MPs who appeared
on both ballots are distinguishable from one another with party list only having the lowest
of the probabilities as expected. This can be interpreted as further support for H2.
For a rudimentary evaluation of H2, Table 6 shows the breakdown of party switching
activity across six legislative terms. The overall trend is that party switching never or only
rarely occurred before 1990 and surged in the terms immediately following the binding refer-
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endum. Following the first referendum in 1991, the 1990-1993 term witnessed five switchers.
This number jumped to 13 during the 1993-1996 term after the binding referendum where
MMP rules were selected in the 1993 general election. The first term — 1996-1999— under
the new rules retained a high number of switchers. Six years later and after the prohibition of
party switching expired, the number of party switching returned to lower levels. This serves
as a preliminary test that demonstrates some support for the expectation that the change in
electoral rules would be associated with a change in party switching behavior perhaps due
to uncertainty.
Table 6. Party switchers by term
Non-Switchers Switchers Total MPs
1984-1987 95 0 95
(100%) (0%)
1987-1990 96 1 97
(99.0%) (1.0%)
1990-1993 93 5 98
(94.9%) (5.1%)
1993-1996 87 13 100
(87%) (13%)
1996-1999 108 12 120
(90%) (10%)
1999-2002 117 3 120
(97.5%) (2.5%)
2002-2005 118 2 120
(98.3%) (1.7%)
2005-2008 119 2 121
(98.3%) (1.7%)
2008-2011 121 1 122
(99.2%) (0.8%)




Figure 8. Proportion of party switchers in New Zealand by legislative term
To better visualize the occurrence of party switching during the terms included in the
dataset, Figure 8 shows party switching was at its highest rate during the 1993-1996 leg-
islative term which is before any actual change to the electoral rules went into effect. This
increase in party switching from the previous term may be attributable to legislators prepar-
ing for the impending rules changes by splintering from the two major parties, the National
Party and the Labour Party, and forming new parties such as the New Zealand First and
Alliance parties. This activity continued during the following legislative term once the rules
changes went into effect. The 1996 election saw several parties receive their first seat in
parliament including the United, Conservative, and Christian Democrat parties.
As Table 6 shows, this behavior drastically reduced during the 1999-2002 term. The
Electoral Integrity Act of 2001 banned party switching in the legislature. Any MP who
changed parties would immediately be forced to contest their seat in a by-election unless
they simply left a party to become an unaffiliated independent legislator, a tactic used
several of the switchers in the table during this time period. This ban expired in 2005 yet
party switching has not returned to the levels of the mid-1990s. However, the levels have
not returned to the levels of the 1980s and earlier either.
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11 Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided evidence in support of the vote-seeking hypothesis in New
Zealand. Legislators with greater vote shares are less likely to switch parties than MPs that
received smaller vote shares. Additionally, legislators elected under SMD rules are much more
likely to change party affiliations. However, in keeping with the literature, it is appropriate
to note that SMD and PR legislators in an MMP system should not be expected to behave
in similar fashion as their pure SMD and PR counterparts (Crisp, 2007). In a model that
includes the ballot listings of an MP, there still remains a large significant difference between
legislators that were only on a district ballot and legislators that were only on the party
list with the former more likely to switch than the latter with those on both ballots having
an intermediate probability of party switching. Future research should try to uncover why
party switching increased with the introduction of PR into the electoral rules under MMP
but PR-elected legislators and MPs that were only on the party list ballot are less likely to
switch parties.
Another finding of this paper is that the increase in party switching is associated with
the electoral rules changes implemented in 1996. This rather obvious finding can be better
understood by research that investigates the degree of uncertainty that surrounded MPs
during the 1990s. This could be accomplished by comparing district maps to see how districts
were redrawn and the partisanship of the areas absorbed by some districts for this could
explain why party switching was used as a strategy to improve reelection chances.
Some components of the party switching literature at large should work to improve are
the incorporation of other explanations other than vote-, office-, and policy-seeking and to
develop better measures of these concepts. This paper would benefit from the inclusion
of vote-seeking indicators such as margin of victory and vote trajectories based on pass
performances, office-seeking data on committee chairmanship and leadership positions, and
policy-seeking variables such as ideal points and Rice scores. All of these legislative indicators
could be buttressed with comparing dates of party changes with coalition formations or
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bill passage and with newspaper accounts in order to determine the precise reasons why
legislators decide to switch parties.
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Appendix 1: Cross-National Analysis Data
Descriptive statistics
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables included in statistical analysis.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Party switching 2,062 0.084 0.278 0 1
District vote % 2,021 46.616 13.705 1.8 92
Party national vote % 2,042 32.264 12.664 0.1 48.8
In government 2,058 0.525 0.499 0 1
Party ideological extremity 2,034 13.152 14.082 0.052 48.432
SMD 2,061 0.868 0.339 0 1
ENPP 2,062 3.638 1.732 1.74 6.09
District magnitude (logged) 2,048 0.351 0.996 0 4.007
Mixed-member indicator 2,062 0.433 0.496 0 1
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Table 2. Logistic regression results with robust standard errors clustered by legislative term. Replication
of main models with the addition of country dummies.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
District vote % −0.024∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.003) (0.010) (0.025)
Party national vote % − −0.035∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.029)
District % × Party % − − 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
In government 0.009 0.479∗∗ 0.425∗
(office-seeking) (0.231) (0.207) (0.238)
Party ideological extremity 0.008 0.017∗ 0.018∗∗
(policy-seeking) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
SMD − 1.644∗∗∗ 2.123∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.573)
ENPP − 0.265 −0.232
(0.279) (0.350)
Country †
Italy 1.705∗∗∗ 2.931∗∗∗ −2.813∗∗
(0.049) (0.887) (1.112)
New Zealand 0.707∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗
(0.409) (0.365) (0.435)
UK −1.138∗∗∗ −0.969∗∗∗ −1.036∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.249) (0.296)
Constant −2.371∗∗∗ −1.637∗∗ −0.702
(0.279) (0.831) (1.057)
AIC 959.2 935.8 926.8
Log Likelihood -475.6 -461.9 -457.4
N observations 1992 1991 1991
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01. † = excluded country is Canada.
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Logistic Regression Models
Table 3. Logistic regression results with robust standard errors clustered by legislative term.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
District vote % −0.050∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Party national vote % −0.070∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
District % × Party % 0.001 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In government 0.295 0.413 0.393
(office-seeking) (0.259) (0.259) (0.268)
Party ideological extremity 0.016 0.018∗ 0.018∗
(policy-seeking) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
SMD − 2.843∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.587)
ENPP 0.459∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.140) (0.183)
District magnitude (logged) −0.312 0.375 −
(0.343) (0.279)
Mixed-member − − 0.061
(0.707)
Constant −1.878 −3.341∗∗∗ −2.317∗∗∗
(0.171) (1.218) (0.669)
AIC 1968 949 953
Log Likelihood -478 -468 -470
N observations 1990 199 1991
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4. Logistic regression results with robust standard errors clustered by legislative term.
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
District vote % −0.090∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.104∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) (0.022)
Party national vote % −0.098∗∗ −0.015 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.055) (0.006) (0.035)
District % × Party % 0.002∗ −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In government 0.604∗∗∗ 0.859 0.093 0.354
(office-seeking) (0.229) (0.687) (0.391) (0.251)
Party ideological extremity 0.022∗∗∗ −0.031 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016
(policy-seeking) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.011)
SMD 2.164∗∗∗ 0.082 2.429∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.541) (0.199) (0.628)
ENPP 0.464∗∗∗ 0.085 0.709∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(0.161) (0.708) (0.026) (0.156)
Constant −2.178∗∗ −1.287 −3.202∗∗∗ −1.666∗∗
(0.881) (2.293) (0.231) (0.800)
AIC 862 378 706 871
Log Likelihood -426 -184 -351 -430
N observations 1682 1369 1581 1341
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
Model 7 is without Canada, 8 is without Italy, 9 is without New Zealand, and 10 is without the UK.
60
Rare Events Logit Models
Table 5. Rare events logistic regression results.
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
District vote % −0.084∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.100∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020) (0.017)
Party national vote % −0.096∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.042) (0.029) (0.025)
District % × Party % 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In government 0.387 0.593∗∗ 0.850∗ 0.085 0.345
(office-seeking) (0.245) (0.253) (0.508) (0.283) (0.243)
Party ideological extremity 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.028 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(policy-seeking) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
SMD 1.950∗∗∗ 2.111∗∗∗ −0.042 2.362∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗
(0.477) (0.491) (0.803) (0.548) (0.468)
ENPP 0.502∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.090 0.699∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059) (0.336) (0.082) (0.275)
Constant −2.326∗∗∗ −2.170∗∗∗ −1.290 −3.173∗∗ −1.656∗∗∗
(0.515) (0.526) (1.260) (0.686) (0.540)
AIC 896 807 115 659 816
Penalized Log Likelihood -440 -396 -160 -322 -400
N observations 1991 1682 1369 1581 1341
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
Model 12 is without Canada, 13 is without Italy, 14 is without New Zealand, and 15 is without the UK.
Estimates generated using Firth’s logit. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Multilevel Logit Models: Legislative Term
Table 6. Multilevel logistic regression results with individual legislators nested within legislative terms.
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
District vote % −0.089∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.250 −0.103∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.018)
Party national vote % −0.120∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.074 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.050) (0.030) (0.027)
District % × Party % 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In government 0.415∗ 0.597∗∗ 0.828∗ 0.093 0.443∗
(office-seeking) (0.246) (0.255) (0.464) (0.286) (0.249)
Party ideological extremity 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.018 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(policy-seeking) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007)
SMD 2.033∗∗∗ 2.093∗∗∗ −0.241 2.429∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.509) (0.925) (0.555) (0.493)
ENPP 0.380 0.361 −0.249 0.709∗∗∗ 0.260
(0.267) (0.281) (0.651) (0.083) (0.275)
Constant −1.687 −1.577 −3.202∗∗∗ −1.656∗∗ −1.062
(1.038) (1.106) (2.080) (0.695) (1.037)
Intercept variance 0.853 −0.950 0.001 −1.656∗∗ 0.675
(0.561) (0.676) (0.587) (0.001) (0.510)
X2 63.66 59.04 22.48 139.53 61.68
Log Likelihood -460 -415 -175 -351 -423
N observations 1991 1682 1369 1581 1341
N legislative terms 7 6 6 3 6
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
Model 17 is without Canada, 18 is without Italy, 19 is without New Zealand, and 20 is without the UK.
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Appendix 2: New Zealand Analysis Data
Descriptive statistics
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of variables included in statistical analysis.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Party switching 439 0.073 0.260 0 1
District vote % 439 42.989 14.698 1.51 74.5
In government 439 0.526 0.500 0 1
Party ideological extremity 437 19.873 15.689 1.124 49.18
SMD 439 0.756 0.430 0 1
Ballot type 439 1.932 0.967 1 3
Party national vote % 439 33.732 12.144 1.51 48.8
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Logistic Regression Models
Table 8. Logistic regression results on legislative party switching in New Zealand with robust standard
errors clustered by legislative term.
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
District vote share (%) −0.060∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.026
(vote-seeking) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Party vote share (%) −0.054∗ −0.065 −0.087∗∗ −0.080
(vote-seeking) (0.029) (0.080) (0.039) (0.086)
District % × Party % − 0.001 − 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
In government 1.923∗∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.904) (0.800) (0.914)
Party ideological extremity 0.021 0.022 0.035∗ 0.034∗
(0.027) (0.076) (0.018) (0.020)
SMD 2.109∗∗∗ 2.201∗∗∗ − −
(0.557) (0.257)
Ballot type †
Party list only − − −3.093∗∗∗ −3.076∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.146)
Both SMD and Party list − − −2.070∗∗∗ −2.052∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.194)
Constant −1.653∗∗ −1.532 0.163 0.064
(0.654) (0.233) (0.525) (0.436)
AIC 200.5 200.5 192.4 192.3
Log Likelihood -97.3 -97.3 -93.2 -93.2
N observations 437 437 437 437
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
† = excluded category is SMD electorate ballot only.
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Logistic Regression Models
Table 9. Logistic regression results on legislative party switching in New Zealand with robust standard











District vote share (%) −0.095 −0.073 −0.023 −0.069∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.071) (0.051) (0.025) (0.008)
Party vote share (%) − − −0.097∗ −0.103∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.050) (0.045)
In government − 0.638 2.610∗∗ 2.623∗∗
(0.959) (1.002) (0.045)
Party ideological extremity − −0.026 0.065∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.137) (0.029) (0.033)
Ballot type †
Party list only − − 11.872∗∗∗ 13.141∗∗∗
(0.867)
Both SMD and Party list − − 12.864∗∗∗ 14.022∗∗∗
(0.815) (0.842)
Period ‡
Impending change − − 0.171 −0.094
(0.437) (0.632)
Post-change − − −15.686∗∗∗ −19.562∗∗∗
(1.769) (2.509)
District % × Period
Impending change − − − −0.002
(0.009)
Post-change − − − 0.056∗∗∗
(0.019)
Constant 2.078 1.146 −0.014 2.485∗∗
(3.525) (2.691) (0.453) (0.990)
AIC 32.5 80.9 184.5 184.9
Log Likelihood -14.3 -36.5 -88.3 -87.4
N observations 68 100 437 437
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
† = excluded category is SMD electorate ballot only and ‡ = excluded category is Pre-referendum.
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Rare Events Logit Models
Table 10. Rare events logistic regression results.
Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33
District vote share (%) −0.096∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.026
(vote-seeking) (0.037) (0.030) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017)
Party vote share (%) − − − − −0.085∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.023)
In government 0.366 2.619∗∗∗ 1.587∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 2.258∗∗∗
(1.196) (0.845) (0.498) (0.505) (0.528)
Party ideological extremity −0.069 0.074∗∗ 0.025 0.033∗ 0.033∗
(0.157) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
SMD − 1.494 1.914∗∗ − −
(1.043) (0.814)
Ballot type †
Party list only − − − −2.195∗∗ −2.631∗∗
(1.021) (1.096)
Both SMD and Party list − − − −1.359∗∗ −1.937∗∗∗
(0.572) (0.616)
Constant −2.516 −3.629∗∗∗ −1.902∗∗∗ −0.777 0.152
(2.561) (1.286) (0.644) (0.765) (0.845)
AIC 98.1 74.7 187.6 189.0 171.6
Penalized log Likelihood -45.1 -32.4 -88.8 -87.5 -77.8
N observations 197 240 437 437 437
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
† = excluded category is SMD electorate ballot only. Models 29-33 replicate models 4-8 in the text of the
New Zealand analysis but with a rare events logit (Firth’s logit) instead of a basic logistic regression.
Model 29 includes the 1990-1993 and 1993-1996 terms and model 30 includes the 1996-1999 and 2005-2008
terms. Models 31-33 are pooled models including all four terms. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
66
Multilevel Logit Models: Legislative Term
Table 11. Multilevel logistic regression results with individual legislators nested within legislative terms.
Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38
District vote share (%) −0.102∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.029∗
(vote-seeking) (0.038) (0.033) (0.027) (0.019) (0.017)
Party vote share (%) − − − − −0.087∗∗∗
(vote-seeking) (0.024)
In government 0.305 2.974∗∗∗ 1.856∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗
(1.083) (0.936) (0.575) (0.554) (0.551)
Party ideological extremity −0.103 0.086∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.137) (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.018)
SMD − 1.741 1.401 − −
(1.139) (0.929)
Ballot type †
Party list only − − − −2.080 −3.093∗∗
(1.399) (1.250)
Both SMD and Party list − − − −0.831 −2.070∗∗∗
(0.960) (0.641)
Constant 2.976 −4.200∗∗∗ −2.699∗∗ −1.795 0.163
(2.435) (1.482) (1.133) (1.399) (0.876)
Intercept variance 0.001 0.001 0.607 −0.370 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.738) (0.653) (0.001)
X2 9.20 19.96 18.18 18.89 30.78
Log Likelihood -52.3 -41.6 -98.6 -98.6 -93.2
N observations 197 240 437 437 1341
N legislative terms 2 2 4 4 4
Notes: ∗ = p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01.
† = excluded category is SMD electorate ballot only. Models 34-38 replicate models 4-8 in the text of the
New Zealand analysis but with a rare events logit (Firth’s logit) instead of a basic logistic regression.
Model 34 includes the 1990-1993 and 1993-1996 terms and model 35 includes the 1996-1999 and 2005-2008
terms. Models 36-38 are pooled models including all four terms. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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